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Abstract 
The paper aims to offer an introduction to provincial financial agents as the 
key components in provincial-metropolitan integration of money markets. It 
establishes that PFAs engaged in de facto banking and played an important 
role in local money markets. Both in England and in Tokugawa Japan, they 
were responsible for making decisions whether or not to establish a 
connection with financial agents in the commercial centres. The paper also 
considers some of the financial services facilitated by the existence of 
financial connections between metropolitan and provincial financial agents. 
In both countries, remittances and (particularly in England) investment 
were important financial activities facilitated by such connections, while 
bill-rediscounting appears to have been relevant only in the English case. 
On the other hand, in Japan domain-related business activity forged 
financial links with the commercial centres, links in which provincial 
financial agents played a major role. Also the expansion of inter-domainal 
private trade may have further stimulated the inter-regional financial 
linkages in the late Tokugawa period. 
 
 
Introduction 
There has been a long debate over the issue of the economic benefits of long 
distance trade to the home country since the time of Adam Smith. While economic 
historians of early modern Europe tended to stress the importance of domestic 
factors to economic growth, recent scholarship has renewed its focus on the 
positive link between long distant trade and economic growth.1 In this debate, how 
far the growing need for credit for long distance trade contributed to promoting 
the development of financial markets in Europe is an important yet relatively 
                                                     
1 Inikori 2002; Morgan 2000; Pomeranz 2000; Acemoglu et al 2005. 
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under explored area. The current paper stems from the research project that 
explores this interaction (between trade and finance) in global (comparative) 
perspective by taking an interdisciplinary and archive-based approach to studying 
financial market integration in Britain and Japan in the period 1760-1860.2 
 
Financial market integration has been a key factor in economic development and 
has been the subject of a series of systematic research efforts in the last decade. 
However, historical research into the interactions between provincial and 
metropolitan financial agents and how they contributed to financial market 
integration remains limited. Moreover, we know little about how and when 
nationwide, regular and substantial flows of credit and information emerged in 
Europe, and how they were stimulated by the growth of internal and international 
trade.3 We know even less about the emergence of such flows in other parts of the 
world, and comparative studies on financial market integration are rare.4  
 
The research currently being undertaken by the Leverhulme Trust-funded Money 
Markets and Trade project is the first systematic and comparative analysis of 
nationwide financial and informational flows between metropolitan and provincial 
agents in two very different countries. It seeks to establish how far the interlinking 
of metropolitan and provincial financial agents was a response to the growing 
credit demand from the mercantile sector, and to identify factors influencing 
provincial and metropolitan agents' decisions with regard to inter-regional links, 
including their business and social networks and the local political environment. 
For this purpose, we analyse financial market integration in Britain and Japan 
during the period 1760-1860. A comparison of the British and Japanese cases is 
deliberate. At this time both countries, which were of geographically comparable 
                                                     
2 Leverhulme Research Grant RPG-2017-161: Money Markets and Trade in Early 
Industrialisation: Britain and Japan, 1760-1860. The author is the researcher on the project. 
3 Hudson 2014. 
4 Notable exceptions include Chilosi et. al. (2018), which compares financial market integration 
in Italy with that in the Holy Empire from the late Middle Ages to c.1800. On the development of 
financial markets in Tokugawa Japan from a comparative perspective, see for example Saito 
2012. 
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size,5 witnessed a marked expansion of trade over long distances and proliferation 
of both metropolitan and provincial financial agents. The policy environment 
within which Japanese traders and financial agents operated was far more 
restrictive than that experienced by their counterparts in Britain, with Japanese 
merchants largely confined to trade within the Japanese archipelago by the 
shogunate government. 6  Here the comparison between the two countries is 
particularly fruitful, allowing insights into how the interaction between 
institutions and trade shaped the distinct patterns of financial integration and 
information flows in Britain and Japan.7 Our research is firmly based on a new 
dataset on the nationwide linkages of financial agents in Britain and Japan for 
the period 1760-1860 showing the financial, business and social circumstances of 
provincial and metropolitan financial agents. These datasets comprise hitherto 
under-explored profile data for several hundred financial agents in each country.  
The current paper is the first working paper from this project, and reflects work 
in progress. 
 
The purpose of the current working paper is to offer an introduction to what we 
refer to as provincial financial agents, as they are the key components in this 
research on provincial-metropolitan integration of money markets. In fact, our 
datasets consist primarily of information on several hundreds of such financial 
agents. The following section establishes the definition of provincial financial 
agents by identifying the kind of individuals and firms we are referring to as PFAs 
in England and Japan. Then we consider the contents and nature of the 
                                                     
5 Although the two countries were relatively comparable in size, Tokugawa Japan (292.25 km2) 
was significantly larger than England and Wales (151.2km2). The distance between Osaka and 
Hirosaki, the northern tip of Honshū Island, is 1055.9km while that between Osaka and 
Satsuma, at the southern tip, is 877.9km. It is 508.2km from London to Carlisle and 457.6km 
from London to Penzance. 
6 An isolationist foreign policy was enacted in 1639 by the Tokugawa government, under which 
foreign relations and trade between Japan and other countries were severely limited. Japanese 
nationals were prevented from leaving the country while trade continued with foreign nationals 
including the Chinese and the Dutch East India Company, the Koreans and the Ryūkyū through 
designated ports such as Nagasaki and Tsushima under the tight control of the shogunate 
government. The isolation policy (sakoku) ended in 1854 when the country opened ports of 
Shimoda and Hakodate. 
7 The recent study by Chilosi et. al.(2018) compared capital flows in Italy with the Holy Roman 
Empire c.1350-1800 and found that institutional differences might have fostered financial 
market integration in the Empire during this period. 
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metropolitan-provincial financial connections which will help to identify what 
financial activities PFAs pursued through the metropolitan-provincial financial 
linkages. 
 
 
Provincial Financial Agents 
In this research, we primarily draw on sources from business records, bank 
archives and municipal histories (both published and manuscripts), one of the 
basic objectives of the research being to identify Provincial Financial Agents from 
these sources. The core of the available information from the sources on which we 
draw is the profile depiction of financial agents, that is, individuals who were 
engaged in de facto banking as a distinct business enterprise in England and 
Tokugawa Japan.8 For the purpose of this working paper and the project itself, 
financial agents are defined widely so that different types and sizes of individuals 
and firms can be captured in order to answer different research questions. Those 
individuals and firms were involved in different types of financial services. Some 
operated as one-man businesses or as family businesses (especially so in Japan 
where the family/house was the base unit of business enterprise), while others 
joined bank partnerships and, in the case of England after 1826, joint stock banks. 
In this research, therefore, PFAs can be defined as those financial agents who were 
(potentially) responsible for making decisions whether or not to establish a regular 
connection with financial agents in the commercial capitals (metropolitan 
financial agents). 
 
Using the above definition of financial agents, provincial means non-metropolitan, 
outside of the nation’s commercial and financial centres. In England, it means 
outside of London and its immediate Home Counties shires. In Tokugawa Japan, 
all of the three major cities of Edo, Osaka and Kyoto were commercial and 
financial centres. The Kinai provinces, surrounding Kyoto and Osaka, were an 
economically advanced region and had strong commercial connections with the 
                                                     
8 By banking services we mean supplying a means of payment, funds transfers, (current account) 
deposit taking and lending money. 
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Osaka and Kyoto. The provinces of Izumi, Kawachi and Settsu all belonged to 
Kinai, and are not considered as being provincial for the purposes of this study. 
The same is true of Edo and its surrounding Musashi province.9 
 
Our research also confines its focus to financial agents in provincial towns, 
excluding financial intermediaries such as money lenders in the rural countryside. 
The omission of rural moneylenders may be questioned by some,10 but our focus 
on towns is based on the assumption that the provincial leg/side of the 
metropolitan-provincial financial linkages is more likely to be found in towns than 
in rural villages. Towns were better connected to major transport networks and 
more regularly served by postal services, which was essential for the emergence 
of regular flows of financial capital and information. The typical residence of 
provincial financial agents in England, therefore, was post towns where the 
quickest and safest connection with London could be maintained. In Tokugawa 
Japan, we focus on three kinds of town: castle towns, market towns and port towns. 
This is because two thirds of the country’s land was governed by over 200 semi-
autonomous feudal domains throughout the period and each domain had a castle 
town, market town(s) and shipping port town(s).11 Each domain government ruled 
the towns and rural villages in its territory from the castle town, levied 
business/commercial taxes on the market towns, collected tax rice from rural 
villages, and shipped the tax rice and other local specialities from the shipping 
ports. 
                                                     
9 Recent studies in Japan have begun to discover evidence of financial links that emerged 
between Osaka moneychangers and financial agents in the Kinai regions (Ishii 2007; Kato 2007) 
and Edo financiers and financial agents in the provinces surrounding Edo (Murase 1980; 
Hayashi 2003) in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
10 Attorneys in the English countryside arranged mortgages for farmers (Pressnell 1956; 
Anderson 1972). Many wealthy farmers in Tokugawa Japan were known to be engaged in 
moneylending to rural households and townsmen.  The case of one wealthy elite farming family, 
the Nishimatsu House, which acted as a de facto banker in the early nineteenth century, is well 
known to historians of Tokugawa Japan especially in the English literature (Toby 1991). Some 
rural moneylenders also lent to domains in need of funds. These cases show how advanced rural 
credit markets were, and there are many cases of such elite farmer moneylenders and de facto 
bankers across the country. But we exclude them from our research for the reason stated above. 
Nishimatsu, for example, operated its banking business in a rural peasant village, some dozen 
kilometres southeast of Ōgaki castle town, in Mino region. 
11 Towns can be better defined by, for example, population size, and this will be later elaborated 
on further.  
 6 
In England and Wales, provincial financial agents are drawn from those who 
operated financial enterprises in provincial towns, collectively known as ‘country 
bankers’. 12   Before 1826, country bankers were those individuals involved in 
banking partnerships. This was because the banking legislation in 1707/08 
prevented any banking houses other than the Bank of England that issued notes 
from having more than six partners. Because note issuing was the chief source of 
profits for most country banks, the legislation essentially restricted the size of 
country banks, whether or not they issued notes. In fact such banks often had 
fewer than six partners. 13  It was not until the Bank Act of 1826 that the 
establishment of joint stock banks was permitted and even after 1826, joint stock 
banking with branch networks was slow to grow in England.14 
 
Before 1750, there were a dozen or fewer country banks but growth thereafter was 
rapid, and the number grew to over 300 by 1800. Country bankers often had 
interests in the main industrial and commercial concerns of their town. In fact the 
distinction between merchants, manufacturers and financiers was vague. For 
example, in England, most bankers were often listed in the early commercial 
directories as banker with a dual description such as banker and linen draper, and 
it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that it became common for country 
bank partners to describe themselves as banker only.15 The types of business in 
which bank partners were also engaged other than banking were diverse, but it 
can be said that mercantile type business was more prominent than 
manufacturing type business.  
 
The rise in the number of country banks in England was a response to the 
expansion of both domestic and overseas trade during this period. Expansion of 
domestic industry and trade in the latter half of the eighteenth century increased 
demands for means of payments in particular for wages, but the supply of coins 
                                                     
12 ‘Country bankers’ called themselves ‘bankers’. They spontaneously established their 
businesses and there was no (legal) system of registering these businesses. 
13 Pressnell estimates the average capital size of country banks to be no more than £10,000 in the 
late eighteenth century. Pressnell 1956, p.56 
14 Cottrell 1986, p.150 
15 Dawes & Ward-Perkins 2000. 
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was often insufficient, especially in the countryside, while the circulation of Bank 
of England notes in provincial towns was inconsistent. Country bankers provided 
a means of payment by issuing notes that circulated locally. For the developing 
English financial system, commercial bills arising from domestic and overseas 
trade consisted in large part of liquid assets, and domestic trade bills of six months 
or less comprised most of a bank’s asset portfolio. Even until the 1770s, inland 
bills were still scarce so that many country bankers were investing in bills that 
originated in overseas trade. In the 1780s the expansion of domestic trade fostered 
the growth of markets in inland bills that had originated in other parts of the 
country as investment assets for banks.16 
 
Conventionally, the role of banks in early industrialisation has been considered 
modest.17 For early industrialists, the demand for circulating capital was much 
larger in the growth of production and marketing while fixed capital requirements 
were relatively modest because early manufacturing firms could convert existing 
buildings into factories without major alteration. Country bankers were able to 
meet businesses’ growing demand for circulating capital by providing short term 
credit through discounting their bills. Country bankers also provided long-term 
credit to favoured customers by providing overdrafts, and allowed long-term credit 
by renewing bills of exchange. 18  Some country bankers especially in the 
nineteenth century invested heavily in local manufactures that were closely 
connected to them.19 Bankers established and exploited personal relationships 
with their clients in order to acquire precious financial information about them 
through the practice of interlocking directorships and shareholding.20 Socially, 
country bankers were often the wealthiest residents of the town. Many country 
bank partners were major landholders as landholding was one of the most visible 
signs of wealth which helped to generate respect and trust from local clients 
towards the bank.21 Financial agents were often respected members of the local 
                                                     
16 Pressnell 1956. pp. 435-36. 
17 Temin and Voth 2013. 
18 Hudson 1990, pp.218-23. 
19 Brunt 2006. 
20 Hudson 1990, p.218; Collins and Hudson, 1979; Newton 1990; Lamoreaux, 1994. 
21 Pressnell 1956, pp.237-40. 
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community. A number of early country bankers occupied high offices in the local 
community such as High Sheriff, Freeman, Alderman or Mayor of their town and 
also often represented in local and national government, for example as Members 
of Parliament.22 
 
Although there was no commercial banks in Japan until the Meiji period, a large 
number of men of wealth were providing quasi banking services in the provincial 
areas outside of Osaka, the commercial and financial centre, Kyoto, the centre of 
production and finance, and Edo, the political and increasingly commercial capital. 
Many merchants (and to a lesser extent manufacturers), while staying engaged in 
other branches of trade, operated de-facto banking businesses. Amongst the broad 
range of quasi-bankers, we focus on moneychangers, the so-called kakeya agents 
and the domain paper money issuers, because these individuals were potential 
decision makers when it came to establishing a metropolitan connection.  
 
Tokugawa money changers were chiefly engaged in currency exchange between 
gold, silver and copper. During the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate government 
established a three-tier metallic currency system based on gold, silver and copper 
coins. The monme of silver denomination was used as the unit of account in Osaka 
while the ryō of gold denomination was used in Edo. The mon (copper 
denomination) was used for smaller transactions throughout the country and 
increasingly in larger transactions in number of regions, too.23 Generally speaking, 
monme/silver currency was used in provincial domains with a commercial link 
with Osaka while gold/ryō currency was preferred in the domains closer to Edo. 
Money changers were engaged in fund transfers of different denominations 
between regions, which required currency exchange.24  
                                                     
22 One of the practical benefits of having an MP partner for a country bank was ‘franking’ which 
was the right to send letters without paying postage as a privilege of MPs. This could save the 
bank as much as £1,300 a year. Dawes and Ward-Perkins 2000. 
23 Iwahashi 2002 and 2019. 
24 The Tokugawa government set the official exchange rate. In the 18th century, 1 ryō of gold was 
equivalent to 60 monme of silver or 4,000 mon of copper, but in practice the three types of coins 
were exchanged at fluctuating rates. 
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In Osaka, the number of money changers fluctuated throughout the Tokugawa 
period. Ten elite moneychangers formed the first association of money changers in 
Osaka in 1662. The overall number of money changers rose to its peak of 400-500 
by the mid-eighteenth century. The number began to decline from the end of the 
century to some 200 in the nineteenth century, and to about 150 in the Bakumatsu 
era (1860s).25 The business of moneychangers included gold and silver exchange, 
taking current account deposits, issuing furi-tegata notes and azukari-tegata notes, 
fund transfers, and extending credit.26 Moneychangers in Osaka issued several 
types of notes but two main types were important. Azukari-tegata notes were 
deposit notes issued by them to current deposit holders, and could be paid to the 
bearer on demand. Merchants who received the notes tended to pass them to their 
own creditors to clear the debts without cashing them. Furi-tegata notes were 
equivalent to today’s cheques and were drawn by the current account depositors. 
Furi-tegata notes also circulated amongst merchants and were endorsed by each 
holder.27 By the end of the Tokugawa period (mid-nineteenth century), most of 
Osaka’s commercial transactions were settled by these tegata notes.28 By contrast, 
notes and bills did not circulate in Edo as much as in Osaka and commercial 
transactions were mostly settled by cash.29 Provincial money changers offered 
similar services to their counterparts in Edo and Osaka although the circulation 
of notes was not so prevalent in provincial towns as it was in Osaka. The 
distinction between merchants and moneychangers was vague in provincial towns 
since most moneychangers operated financial services while still conducting their 
commercial activities. Many moneychangers had their origins in trading rice and 
textiles, or in sake brewing, before obtaining an official money-changing license 
from the local domain government. 
                                                     
25 Nakagawa 2003. 
26 Shimbo 1967; Tsurumi 1984; Shizume 2008: Shikano 2000. Matsuyoshi 1932; Sakudō 1961; 
Ishii 2007. 
27 According to a recent study by Ishii, endorsements on the back of tegata notes were only to 
acknowledge payments and the duration of a tegata’s circulation was limited (up to 5 days). Ishii 
2007. 
28 Sakudō 1958. 
29 Credit sales had been traditionally common amongst Osaka wholesalers, firstly by settling of 
book credits and later by the use of tegata notes. On the other hand, Edo’s commercial 
transactions were predominantly retail trade and almost all transactions were settled by cash. 
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What are called kakeya agents first appeared in the late seventeenth century, and 
were appointed by domains to manage various financial issues. The business of 
kakeya agents stemmed from the establishment of the so called alternate 
attendance system (sankin kōtai) which was formalised in 1635 and lasted until 
the collapse of the Shogunate in 1867.  Under this system, the Tokugawa 
Shogunate allowed the provincial domain lords semi-autonomous authority in 
their territories such as levying taxes. In return, the domain lords were required 
to reside in Edo for two years and then for two years in their domains, while their 
wives and heirs were required to live permanently in Edo as hostages to deter the 
lords from rebelling against the Shogunate. Domain governments inevitably 
required funds to maintain their administrative and household expenses in Edo 
and, in order to obtain the necessary cash, domain governments shipped tax rice 
and local specialities to the central markets such as Osaka30, sold them there and 
sent the funds to Edo. Domains would appoint Osaka merchants (called kuramoto) 
as the official carriers of the domain products between the domain territory and 
the central market. These kuramoto merchants were in charge of shipping the tax 
rice and local specialities, delivering them to the domain’s warehouses in Osaka 
and selling them to the city’s wholesalers. The role of kakeya merchants, also 
designated by the domain governments, was to collect the money from the 
purchasers, to look after the funds and to remit money to the domain office in Edo. 
Although many domains designated merchants in commercial centres as the 
official kakeya, there were also provincial kakeya agents who operated in 
provincial towns. Some domains had their own local rice markets where provincial 
kakeya agents sold the rice on behalf of the domain and administered the domain’s 
money from the sales.  
 
These men of wealth like money changers and kakeya agents were often engaged 
in the issuing of domain paper currency notes called hansatsu. In the seventeenth 
century, some domains already attempted to issue paper currency to meet the 
needs for means of payment demanded by the growing commerce. The Shogunate 
government had a monopoly on most of the country’s mines and was the sole issuer 
                                                     
30 Miyamoto 1988. 
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of hard currency, but the decline of the precious metal stock in the late seventeenth 
century meant that the currency supply increasingly fell short of meeting the 
demands. In 1774, the Shogunate government prohibited domains from issuing 
paper money, but by the mid-eighteenth century many domain governments 
introduced the issue of paper money to finance their fiscal deficits as well as to 
supply an adequate amount of currency to the territory.31 In many regions, the 
issuing of paper money was handled by the domain’s office for commerce, known 
as the kaisho. This office was manned by both the domain’s fiscal officers and 
wealthy local merchants (PFAs) to oversee trade and finance in the domain 
territory. The kaisho-associate merchants were effectively in charge of the daily 
handling of paper money and their business premises were designated as places 
where these notes could be redeemed. The credibility of domain paper money was 
maintained by the commitment of these local merchants. Even when some 
domains faced defaults due to excess issuing, domain paper money continued to 
circulate because of the credibility of the designated merchants. 
 
Landholding was, like in England, a common characteristic of PFAs in Japan. 
Their holdings of property in towns and of arable land rose by means of purchase 
and by acquisition through loan collateral.  Many financial agents were respected 
residents of the town, holding the hereditary position of machi-doshiyori (town 
alderman). In each castle-town and in market towns, there were usually three 
aldermen, appointed by the local domain and under the control of the town 
magistrates (bugyō); they held hereditary office and received a salary, and were 
granted privileges such as wearing swords and having a family name.32 Some 
PFAs had more direct political ties with local domains through their position as 
goyōtashi. Goyōtashi status was given to merchants and manufacturers in castle-
towns, and sometimes in market towns, who provided particular goods or services 
to the domain. In the second half of the Tokugawa era, they frequently provided 
funds to domains, either by direct contribution or by indirectly funding the 
                                                     
31 Iwahashi 2019. 
32 Their duties involved the communication of the magistrates’ edicts and the conveyance of 
reports and petitions from the town’s people to the magistrates. 
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domain’s economic projects such as poor relief and the issue of domain paper 
money. 
 
It must be acknowledged, therefore, that provincial financial agents in England 
and Tokugawa Japan were in many respects very different in their nature, but 
even so some qualities in common can be identified. In particular, during much of 
this period, the business of financial agents was carried out as a one man business 
or a private partnership. Financial agents came from the wealthiest residents of 
the town and as the financier business grew successful, many of them began 
accumulating more land and properties that enhanced the social standing of the 
family. This eventually led to privileges (aristocratic titles in England and 
honorary stipends in Japan) being given to the family which led to even higher 
social standing. In both cases some financial agent families were able to maintain 
the business over successive generations. It must be also acknowledged that 
provincial financial agents occupied a pivotal position in the provincial 
financial/credit market and therefore were (potentially) responsible in linking the 
local money market with the metropolitan financial market. 
 
 
The nature of metropolitan-provincial financial connections: 
preliminary accounts 
L.S. Pressnell is widely regarded as the most authoritative scholar on English 
country banking in this period even half a century after the publication of his book 
Country Banks in the Industrial Revolution. 33  According to Pressnell, what 
created the co-evolution of London and country banks and their connections was 
the localised system of banking and country banks’ needs to maintain ties with 
the metropolitan money market. He argued that the prevalence of localised 
banking led to the development of the London money market’s intermediary 
functions, ‘to employ the funds of the saving areas and, to procure capital for the 
investing areas of the country’.34 It would therefore be helpful for us to identify 
                                                     
33 Pressnell 1956. 
34 Pressnell 1956, p.1. 
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what were the needs of English country bankers when it came to maintaining ties 
with the London money market, because this should provide some background for 
understanding the decision making by country bankers on the issue of whether or 
not to establish a connection with London. 
 
As noted earlier, the localised banking in England and Wales was the result of 
banking legislation/regulation. The Bank of England (established in 1694) had 
been granted, by 1708, a monopoly of joint stock banking in England and Wales. 
(Scotland developed a different and more centralised system of banking.)  Private 
bankers in London provided country banks with financial services through 
correspondence banking arrangements. Country bankers were more or less 
unitarily small in capital size and private partnership structure, and were 
dispersed widely across the country, but some country banks created a network of 
banking over a wide area through family connections, inter-marriage, kinship and 
religious affiliations.35 The Smith Banks in the Midlands, for example, created a 
network of banking in Nottingham, Derby, Lincoln, Hull and London through 
family connections between the 1750s and 1780s.36 In this way, they were able to 
exploit similar benefits to those of a branch banking system (which became more 
common with the arrival of joint stock banking). However, the majority of country 
banks did not belong to such banking networks and remained more or less 
localised. 
 
Pressnell provided some ideas about the nature of the correspondence relationship 
between country banks and their London correspondent banks. The main contents 
of the correspondence between provincial and London banks, he suggests, 
concerned the remittance of bills and notes, the purchase of government securities 
and related services like the collection of dividends, balance transfers between 
country banks and bill re-discounting. 37  Regarding these functions, Pressnell 
suggested that ‘[u]ntil internal trade had increased considerably, the country 
                                                     
35 The example of quasi-branch banking through religious affiliation is most notably seen in the 
case of the Quakers. 
36 Leighton-Boyce 1958; Gent 2016. 
37 Pressnell 1956. pp.75-80, 105 and 415-30. 
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demand for remittance to London was probably greater than country demand for 
discount of London bills received in trade’. Government securities purchases by 
London banks for country banks became important when the Napoleonic Wars 
broke out in 1793. In Pressnell’s view, therefore, it was the need for remittances 
to London that originally promoted the connections between London agents and 
country banks.  
 
By the early seventeenth century, the London bill was becoming a usual method 
of payment in transactions between provincial towns and London. 38  In the 
eighteenth century, one of the most important remittance activities was 
government revenue collection. Many of the stages between the collection of taxes 
and their payment into the Exchequer in London required the development of 
London-country bank correspondence. First, the taxes were collected locally in a 
variety of payment media that were locally accepted (coins, bills, Bank of England 
notes or country bank notes).39 But they were usually sent to London in the form 
of bills and drafts drawn on the London agents. Because of the delay in remittance 
to London and payment into the Exchequer, both the country bankers and the 
London agents that were involved in revenue collection services were in effect able 
to keep deposits. Between the revenue collection and its remittance to London, the 
revenue collector country bank was able to add public money to the cash reserve 
of the bank, which enabled the bank to provide more bills of exchange and private 
credit. Once remitted to London, the funds were added to the country bank’s credit 
balance with the London agent bank which made it possible for the country bank 
to draw even more London bills. County bankers particularly preferred handling 
Land Tax and Stamp Duties because there was almost always a prolonged delay 
in paying these revenues to the government offices. An example of revenue 
remittance by country banks to London banks can be seen in the case of Berwick, 
Lechemere & Co of Worcester. The bank was established in 1772 by Joseph 
Berwick who was Receiver General of Taxes for Worcestershire, and was the first 
bank in Worcester. Most of the bank’s capital came from Berwick’s collected taxes 
                                                     
38 Kerridge 1991. 
39 About the variety of a means of payment in this period, see Ashton 1945. 
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which he was allowed to keep for six months before sending to London. The bank 
established a connection with Cocks, Biddulph & Co. in London and began sending 
taxes there by using bills of exchange at least from 1781.40 Molesworth, Elliot & 
Co of Exeter was another country bank that sent collected excise taxes to Cocks, 
Biddulph & Co. from at least 1775.41 The rise in government expenditure and 
taxation during the Napoleonic Wars gave an even greater stimulus to country 
bankers and their London agents to intensify the revenue remittance link.42 
  
Next, Pressnell argued that the emergence of the regular financial link with the 
London market that became a leading feature of early country banking in the 
second half of the eighteenth century was promoted by the increasing use of bills 
of exchange and commercial papers drawn on London.43 The bills of exchange were 
circulated by endorsement in the London discount market, and the discounter 
continued to be liable to the full value of the bill until it was finally settled by the 
issuer or the acceptor of the bill.44 Country banks were active discounters of bills 
of exchange particularly in the latter half of the eighteenth century.  If the demand 
for bill discounting from local customers became greater than could be met by a 
country banker’s capacity, the bank could send the bills to its London agent bank 
for re-discounting. In London, the London banks (and later bill brokers) would 
match the bills with those which had surplus funds for discounting, at a 
commission.45 The bills that were discounted by both country and London banks 
were inland (as opposed to foreign) commercial bills of six months duration or less. 
Once a bill had two months duration or less, London banks were allowed, if needed, 
to get it discounted at the Bank of England. As the Bank of England demanded 
‘two good London names’ (endorsement references) on any bill discounted at the 
Bank, country bankers had to have the endorsement of the London agent bank.46  
                                                     
40 Cocks, Biddulph & Co, Ledger account with Berwick, Lechmere & Co. Barclays Bank Group 
Archives. 
41 Cocks, Biddulph & Co. Ledger account with Molesworth, Elliot, Mackworth, Praed & Co. 
Barclays Bank Group Archives. 
42 Pressnell 1956, pp.56-73. 
43 Pressnell 1956. 
44 Rogers 2004. 
45 King, 1936; Pressnell 1956. 
46 King 1936. 
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Such an intermediary function of the London money market matched the demand 
and supply of capital in different regions: the capital need in industrialising 
regions like Lancashire and the Midlands and the surplus capital in agricultural 
regions or regions with declining industries seeking profitable outlets. According 
to Black, the Bank of Westmorland in Kendal, for example, when it had a surplus 
of money between 1833 and 1838 transferred funds through its London 
correspondent banks such as Glyn, Mills & Co. to several industrial towns in the 
north of England. The Kendal bank was able to request short-dated bills of 
exchange, through the London bank, from a bank, say, in Manchester (which had 
a corresponding relationship with the London bank) and request again for these 
to be credited with the Manchester bank’s account with the London bank.47 In 
England, therefore, rediscounting of bills was fundamental to the emergence of 
London-provincial financial linkages, but the Tokugawa economy did not see any 
comparable development in bill rediscounting. Although financial institutions 
such as money changers regularly issued various types of bills and notes such as 
azukari-tegata and furi-tegata, financial agents did not offer discounting 
facilities.48 The Tokugawa economy did not see the emergence of a market for 
bills,49 so re-discounting of bills did not play a role in the making of inter-regional 
financial links in Tokugawa Japan.  
 
In England a country banker with surplus resources was able to invest the funds 
in London through the connection with the London banks. The country banker 
was able to pledge the funds with his London agent and receive interest on it: 
London banks normally did not pay interest to their ordinary clients but country 
bankers were treated as exceptional and they received interest on their credit 
balances.50 Moreover, a country banker was also able to seek the opportunity to 
invest in various types of government securities such as 3% Consols, Bank of 
                                                     
47 Black 1995. 
48 Miyamoto 1959, p.20. For the variety of bills and notes issued by the Tokugawa financiers and 
merchants in English, see Crawcour 1961. It was not until the early Meiji period that Japan 
introduced various laws relating to the joint liability of bills. Tsurumi 1984. 
49 An exception was the Dojima rice bill market in Osaka where rice bills were used for futures 
trading. Takatsuki 2012. 
50 Pressnell 1956, pp.402-15.  
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England stocks, and Exchequer Bills. Flood, Lott & Co. of Honiton, for example, 
appointed their London agent bank, Cocks, Biddulph & Co. to act in transactions 
relating to Consols in 1801.51 Similarly country bankers provided their customers 
with the investment channels in London. Government securities issued by the 
Bank of England, the East India Company and the South Sea Company were 
popular outlets while stocks like 3% stocks were becoming very popular amongst 
investors with smaller funds. But investment in these government securities 
needed to be made in London and dividends were only paid there. The country 
bankers and their London agents provided provincial investors with reliable 
facilities for such purposes. Management of investment by country bankers 
increased during the Napoleonic Wars while the growth of the national debt rose 
from £228 millions to £660 millions (1793-1802/3).52 There was an incentive for 
country bankers in the handling of investment as a provincial investor was 
required to deposit the money with the handling bank 43 days before the purchase 
of stock. The country banks were thus able to profit from the investment money 
that passed through their hands before sending to London.53 In England and 
Wales, therefore, it was the existence of a localised banking system that 
necessitated country bankers establishing connections with London financial 
agents. The main financial activities facilitated by the London-provincial linkages 
involved remittances, rediscounting of bills and stock market investment. 
 
Since Tokugawa Japan was politically divided between the shogunate and over 
200 domains, provincial financial agents had to operate under the rule of the local 
domain, so their financial activity was similarly localised. 54  However, some 
provincial financial agents were able to enjoy a degree of quasi-branch advantage 
beyond the limits of the domain. Merchants from Ōmi (today’s Shiga prefecture), 
for instance, were known for peddling textiles and other goods from the Kinai 
                                                     
51 Cocks, Biddulph & Co. Letter from Samuel Lott of Honiton. Barclays Bank Group Archives. 
52 Sir John Sinclair in 1802/3 stated that ‘the proper channel’ for raising public loans seemed to 
be ‘the bankers of Metropolis and their correspondents at home and abroad’, cited in Pressnell 
1956, p.261. 
53 Pressnell 1956, p.262. 
54 Research on the extent of this localisation is still in progress, so some of the comments here are 
of a preliminary nature. 
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region across the country, and eventually opened branches in provincial towns 
especially in the eastern regions of the country. With their headquarters in Ōmi 
and increasingly in Osaka, Kyoto and Edo, the merchant diasporic branches 
maintained a close connection with the headquarters and other provincial 
branches. The Ono House, for example, opened a headquarters in Osaka and a 
successful branch in Morioka. The Morioka branch was managed by Izutsu-ya, a 
merchant family originally from Hino town in Ōmi; they were a typical provincial 
financial agent throughout this period, being engaged in money-changing, 
moneylending to the domain as well as local merchants, the accumulation of land, 
and involvement in the domain’s paper currency at the same time as running 
trading and sake brewing operations. Izutsu-ya procured bills of exchange for local 
merchants and engaged in remittance services with the headquarters in Edo and 
Osaka. In the case of the Shimazaki House, also from Hino, the headquarters and 
its branches in Tochigi were engaged in long term mutual lending.55 
 
In Tokugawa Japan, there was clearly huge demand for remittance and fund 
transfer, at first between major commercial centres and then increasingly between 
provincial towns and the commercial centres and between the provincial towns 
themselves. In Japan, a type of bill called saifu appeared as the method of 
remittance in the fourteenth century. Saifu had two functions: one was proto-
promissory notes and the other was proto-bills of exchange. The use of saifu 
apparently declined in the sixteenth century, while the indigenous method of 
remittance such as kae-jō continued to be used, until bills of exchange [kawase-
tegata] re-appeared in the late seventeenth century as the major method of 
remittance between Osaka, Kyoto and Edo.56 By the early 1660s money changers 
in the major commercial centres were engaged in the inter-regional fund transfer 
business as well as currency exchange services between silver and gold. Fund 
transfers were made using bills of exchange. This was due to the commercial 
distribution system that had newly developed under the Tokugawa government: 
                                                     
55 Suzuki 2009. Similar examples are seen in Isezaki in 1810 (Isezaki shishi 1992), and 
Tatebayashi in 1770 (Tatebayashi shishi 1986). 
56 Sakurai 2000. 
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the combination of rice-tax and the alternate attendance system. On the one hand, 
there was a constant and substantial flow of Shogunate government and domain 
revenues from Osaka to Edo. After obtaining cash from selling tax rice in the rice 
market in Osaka, the Bakufu and domains needed to send the money to Edo to 
finance their residences and administration there. On the other hand, there was 
an almost equally substantial flow of goods from Osaka to Edo and its surrounding 
regions as Edo imported a large quantity of commodities from the advanced Kinai 
region in the eighteenth century. There was hence a need to remit payment from 
Edo to Osaka. The exchange business by moneychangers developed out of this 
settling of commercial payments due from Edo against remittances of domain 
revenues [Edo kawase].  
 
For money to be remitted to Edo, an Osaka financial agent (often a kakeya agent) 
would buy bills drawn by Osaka merchants on their Edo clients and send the bills 
to his Edo agent with an accompanying instruction to pay the proceeds to the 
domain office in Edo. At the same time, the domain’s Edo office would receive a 
notice of remittance from the Osaka kakeya agent and collect the proceeds from 
the Edo agent. This procedure thus made it possible to avoid the cost and danger 
of transporting cash between Edo and Osaka for domains wishing to remit to 
Edo.57 
 
By the eighteenth century, many provincial domains had become active in trading 
their agricultural products for the high quality handicraft goods that were 
produced in the advanced manufacturing region of Kinai. The inter-regional 
commodity flow in the early eighteenth century was therefore centred on Osaka 
where the city’s wholesalers bought commodities from the provinces and re-
                                                     
57 The commission charged by the Osaka kakeya agents for this Edo kawase exchange service, 
was said to be 1 or 2 per cent. The Tokugawa government used a similar system to remit 
government funds from Osaka to Edo. IN 1692, the government appointed a group of ten of the 
most influential moneychangers in Osaka, Edo and Kyoto, such as Mitsui, to undertake the 
remittance of government funds. The shogunate government did not pay commission for this 
service, but the moneychangers were allowed to keep the funds for at least sixty days between 
receiving the funds in Osaka and payment in the government treasury in Edo. Sakudō 1961, 
pp.101-5. 
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exported them to other major markets such as Edo.58 The mid-eighteenth century 
saw some important changes in the structure of this system of commodity flow. 
Two changes were particularly important: many provincial domains had 
developed regional specialisation in producing not only rice but also local 
specialities (raw materials, agricultural products) and the hinterlands 
surrounding Edo had become a major producing area of handicraft goods.59 As 
these changes increased inter-domainal trade, the traditional role of many 
provincial market towns for local trade also grew and changed. They became 
important for both the inter-domainal trade and for the trade with central markets 
like Osaka and ever expanding Edo. While the role of the Osaka wholesale 
merchants may have been challenged by the rise of Edo merchants and the 
possibility of some of the inter-domainal trade bypassing Osaka, the role of Osaka 
in the nation’s distribution system and commercial finance in fact became more 
important as the development of intra-domainal trade progressed.60 The changes 
to the structure of inter-regional trade in the late eighteenth century therefore 
took place both in metropolitan-provincial trade and in inter-domainal trade. With 
this, the importance of financial agents in provincial market towns significantly 
increased, as they provided regular payment exchange channels linking both with 
the commercial centres and with markets in other domains. Many of these 
emerging provincial market towns have been identified as the location of 
provincial financial agents in this research. 
 
We can observe some specific patterns in the metropolitan-provincial or inter-
domain remittance connections. First, bills of exchange were used to settle 
accounts in the direct export of a local speciality commodity to the central markets. 
For example, safflower exports from Dewa to Kyoto in the 1820s were settled 
through remittances between the local dealer and the wholesale merchants.61 
Similar arrangements were used in salt exports from Tokushima and Edo via 
                                                     
58 Miyamoto 1951. 
59 Hayami, Saito and Toby 2004. 
60 Hayami, Saito and Toby 2004. 
61 Iwahashi 2002. 
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Hyōgo in the 1830s.62 In both examples, metropolitan wholesale merchants were 
extending credit or financing the provincial dealers by using bills of exchange. Soy 
sauce brewers in Chōshi became familiar with handling bills of exchange for their 
soy sauce exports to Edo in the 1800s, and acted as financial agents, procuring 
bills of exchange for fellow local tradesmen.63  Second, provincial financial agents 
were forging connections between other provincial market towns to facilitate 
payments for commodity trade. Examples of this include those based on 
remittances using bills of exchange for the trade in second hand clothes between 
Himeji and Dewa in the 1820s,64 and for soya imports from Tsuchiura and Chōshi 
in the 1800s.65 Third, a connection emerged between the towns on the outskirts of 
Osaka and provincial towns. Money changers cum dried sardine merchants in 
Amagasaki and one of Osaka’s surrounding towns established a regular 
correspondence link in 1826.  These money changers on the outskirts of Osaka 
tended to be middle to small scale money changers.66A similar link can be found 
between Osaka and Hyōgo.67  
 
Such widespread use of bills of exchange between central markets and provincial 
towns avoided the cost, inconvenience and danger of transporting cash and had 
the effect of economising on the use of official currency. But it should also be 
acknowledged that many of the examples of inter-regional financial transactions 
concern private trade rather than domainal trade, reflecting the rise of private 
mercantile business especially in the periphery of zaimachi market towns in the 
later Tokugawa period. This implies that provincial financial agents were 
responding to the emergence of new types of mercantile activities in this period by 
forging inter-regional financial linkages. 
 
                                                     
62 Sakudō 1961, pp.332-3. 
63 Hayashi 2003, p.70 ; Similar evidence is seen in Karasuyama in 1800. (Karasuyama shishi 
1973). 
64 Iwahashi 2002. 
65 Hayashi 2003. 
66 Nakagawa 2003. 
67 Ishii 2007. 
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While stock market investment constituted an important part of the metropolitan 
and provincial financial linkages in England, this was not the case in Tokugawa 
Japan where there was no market for shares or government securities throughout 
the period. Nonetheless, the linkages/connections between financial agents in 
provincial towns and Osaka and Edo may have smoothed the flow of surplus funds 
from one region to another. Some metropolitan financial agents in Osaka borrowed 
money from provincial investors and used the funds as a resource for lending in 
Osaka. In the case of the middle-sized moneychanger Ōmiya in Osaka, for example, 
29% of the moneychanger’s borrowed funds were from what can be called 
associational finance (kō) raised in Kishū domain. Associational finance was a 
popular means amongst commoners for raising money for specific causes, such as 
mutual financial aid. Increasingly these funds that were raised were invested in 
Osaka and Kyoto through the hands of provincial domains in the early nineteenth 
century. 68  Domains also invited metropolitan financial agents to manage 
associational finance as was the case with Odawara domain, where Edo money 
changers were designated to organise and manage the associational funds in the 
domain territory. It appears that no local financial agent was involved in this 
business in Odawara.69 
 
What appears to have most prominently forged the regular metropolitan and 
provincial connections for financial agents in Tokugawa Japan was their 
engagement in domain related business and duties. Under the system of alternate 
attendance, as mentioned earlier, domain lords were required to attend Edo every 
two years and to retain a domain residence and office for their retainers and the 
lord’s family. In order to finance their administrative and household expenses in 
Edo, the domain government sold rice and other local specialities in Osaka. The 
tax was collected by the domain government in the form of rice and was then 
shipped from regional ports to the central markets. In this system of the domains’ 
official commodity trade and payments, economic historians are generally agreed 
on the pivotal role played by Osaka financier merchants, but historians are 
                                                     
68Nakagawa 2003. 
69 Odawara shishi 1999. 
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somewhat vaguer about the role played by provincial financial agents. As for 
Osaka financial agents, we know, as described above, that domains appointed a 
number of Osaka merchants as kuramoto and kakeya as official dealers of rice and 
official financial agents there and they issued bills secured against future rice 
harvests.70 
 
Compared to such business activities carried out by Osaka merchants for domain 
governments, in what ways, and how far, were provincial financial agents involved 
in these domain-related commercial activities with the commercial capital? Some 
domains designated local merchants, instead of their Osaka agent financier, to 
manage the financing of trade in the tax rice and local products from the official 
domain port to Osaka, while many domains left this business in the hands of the 
Osaka merchants. In Himeji domain, for instance, an institution was jointly set 
up by the domain and local merchants in Murotsu, the domain’s official port, to 
finance the dried herring trade (used for fertiliser material). The domain 
appointed five local merchants and pledged them funds to run the trade on behalf 
of the domain, and in return received 10% per annum of the value of trade.71 Some 
domains appointed local merchants to effectively run much of the official trade 
with Osaka. The House of Kuboya Kihei of Kaga domain, for example, was 
appointed as representative in negotiating with Osaka financiers on behalf of 
domain officials over the terms of lending to the domain by the Osaka financiers 
as early as the 1740s. Generations of the Kuboya house continued this service for 
the domain until the end of the Tokugawa period. While engaging themselves in 
domain-related financial services, the Kuboya were separately engaged in 
financing a wide range of borrowers from rural villages and other domains while 
at the same time running a general merchant and ship owning business.72 Similar 
examples can be seen in the case of the Shibata and Kajima domains.73 In the case 
                                                     
70 The rice bills (kome-kitte) were traded daily in the Dojima Rice Futures Exchange (Kome 
Kaisho) and circulated in Osaka as liquid financial assets. Takatsuki 2012. As these bills were 
traded as liquid assets, they were used as a means of both short- and long-term lending for 
domains by Osaka moneychangers. 
71 Himeji shishi 1992. 
72 Kaga shishi 1978. 
73 Shibata shishi 1980; Kaga shishi 1978; Kajima shishi 1974.  
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of Matsushiro, the domain government commissioned the local Yada House to 
establish a connection with the Sumiya House in Osaka and to handle the 
domain’s official trade in local specialities in Osaka through the Sumiya.  
 
The case of Matsushiro is interesting, because the domain officials, at the same 
time as Yada was establishing the connection in Osaka, also attempted to open up 
an official domain commercial house in Osaka, through which they sought loans 
from another Osaka money changer. By the time Matsushiro domain opened its 
commercial house, most major Osaka financiers were well aware of defaults by a 
number of other domains and less likely to start lending to Matsushiro. The 
domain officials in Osaka thus targeted wealthy merchants or farmers in the 
surrounding villages of Osaka as a source of funds. (By then the village financiers 
lending to peasants were starting to be less profitable, so they too were looking for 
other lending outlets).74 Although it is generally described in the literature that 
domain officials dealt with the business and negotiations with Osaka financiers 
and merchants, these examples are suggesting that in some domains provincial 
financial agents effectively took an initiative in making metropolitan 
connections.75 
 
 
Conclusion 
Provincial financial agents were, firstly, engaged in de facto banking as a distinct 
business in provincial towns in England and Tokugawa Japan, although many 
may have been running other businesses at the same time. They played an 
important role in financing local trade and industries in provincial money markets. 
These individuals were chiefly country bankers in England and Wales whilst in 
Tokugawa Japan provincial financial agents were found amongst the group of 
money changers, kakeya agents, domain paper currency issuers, and merchant-
                                                     
74 Matsushir -shishi 1986. 
75 Tatebayashi domain appointed local merchant Yanagi Hikohachi as local kakeya agent in 1740 
since his brother Matabei was acting as official kakeya in Edo. This case indicates that the pre-
existing connection with the capital influenced the domain government in its local financial 
strategy. Tatebayashi shishi 2016. 
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financiers. This essay has also pointed out that, despite the differences, there were 
some common characteristics shared by PFAs in England and Tokugawa Japan.  
Provincial financial agents were responsible for making decisions whether or not 
to establish a connection with financial agents in the commercial centres. To 
explore this, the essay has also considered some of the financial activities that 
were facilitated by the existence of financial connections between metropolitan 
and provincial financial agents. Both in England and Tokugawa Japan, but 
particularly in England, remittances and investment activities were important 
financial activities facilitated by such connections, although bill-rediscounting 
appears to have been relevant only in the English case. On the other hand, 
domain-related commercial activity was important in forging financial links with 
the commercial centres in Japan. Although the role provincial financial agents 
played in financing the domain-related trade has not necessarily been clear in the 
existing literature, some of the evidence discussed in this essay suggests that 
provincial financial agents may have played a greater role in financing the 
domanial trade, hence in establishing financial linkages with the commercial 
centres. Furthermore, Tokugawa provincial financial agents may have been 
responding to the expansion of inter-regional private trade by forging inter-
regional financial linkages particularly in the late Tokugawa period. 
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